



**PROTECTED  
TRANSPORT  
SYSTEMS** PTY LTD

30 June 2010

Mr Ken Butler  
Project Director  
Land 121 Phase 4  
Defence Plaza Melbourne (DPM-8)  
661 Bourke Street  
MELBOURNE VIC 3000

Dear Mr Butler

The debrief relating to the unsuccessful Protected Transport Systems Pty Ltd (PTS) response to the Request for Proposal (RFP) LAND121PH4 01/09 for the possible supply of a Manufactured and Supported in Australia (MSA) Protected Mobility Vehicle - Light capability was held at Defence Plaza 3.00 to 4.00 pm on 9<sup>th</sup> June 2010.

From the undocumented DMO response provided to that debrief there appears to be areas where DMO's evaluation processes may have been faulty or improperly applied. This includes the areas of financial, technical, capability evaluation, and due process.

Compared with the information provided by PTS in its Response, the technical assessment also seems to be seriously deficient (refer enclosure – PTS Evaluation Feedback from DMO - Deficiencies) and PTS requests details of that evaluation team's members, their competency and their employers.

PTS has prepared a detailed analysis of DMO's debrief which is enclosed. This analysis refutes DMO's debrief comments and demonstrates that the information supplied in the tender response was accurate. PTS notes that whilst other contenders were contacted by the DMO project team in connection with their submissions, not a single request for either clarification or verification was received by PTS during the duration of the evaluation.

PTS requests that DMO review and provide a written response to this analysis. PTS requests that the decision to exclude PTS from the LAND 121 Phase 4 outcome be reconsidered. Further, the assertion that the PTS Response contains misleading statements should be withdrawn without reservation.

Yours respectfully

Derek Andrews  
Executive Chairman

Enclosures:

1. Background to Debrief
2. Record of Debrief – PTS Questions
3. PTS Evaluation Feedback from DMO – Deficiencies
4. Letters to Ministers

ACN 139 667 744  
Registered Office: 15<sup>th</sup> Floor, 10 Market Street, Brisbane, Qld. 4000  
Postal Address: GPO Box 514, Brisbane, Qld. 4001  
Telephone: (07) 32212628; Facsimile: (07) 32298408

**Response to Request for Proposal LAND121PH4 01/09 PMV-L**

**Debrief for Protected Transport Systems Pty Ltd**

**Request for Reconsideration of Decision**



Right hand drive prototype, due for completion by 31 July 2010

## Background

The debrief relating to the unsuccessful Protected Transport Systems Pty Ltd (PTS) response to the Request for Proposal (RFP) LAND121PH4 01/09 for the possible supply of a Manufactured and Supported in Australia (MSA) Protected Mobility Vehicle - Light capability was held at Defence Plaza 3.00 to 4.00 pm on 9<sup>th</sup> June 2010.

While the meeting requested by PTS was being arranged, PTS received information from Mr Butler regarding the review and complaint procedures that apply to the DMO.

Prior to the meeting, PTS requested in writing that the debriefing team provide PTS a short overview and then address the questions:

- What were all the specific deficiencies that lead to the PTS rejection?
- On what basis was each of these of these specific deficiencies determined to be deficient?
- Where other proposals were similarly deficient; were the deficiencies determined and dealt with in the same way as they were for PTS?
- How were Defence Industry Capability Development policies and other relevant policies applied to this decision?
- How the constitutional requirement (chap IV Trade and Finance section 99) for no preference between states was met?

### DMO Attendees:

Ken Butler – Project Director – LAND 121 Phase 4 Protected Mobility Vehicle – Light Land Vehicle Systems Branch

Anton Le Reveur – Project Manager – LAND 121 Phase 4 Overlander Program

Sandra Watson – Contracting Advisor to Mr Butler

Amelia – Assistant Project Manager

Ellen Williamson – Process Advisor – DLA Phillips Fox

Lorraine Polmear – Contract Officer

Tim Palmer – Branch Finance Manager / Evaluation Member

### PTS Attendees:

Derek Andrews, Executive Chairman PTS and Business Development Manager, Great Western Corporation Pty Ltd [GWC]

Koos de Wet, Technical Director PTS and Armour Design Consultant

Jonathon Skinner, Company Secretary PTS and Chief Financial Officer GWC Holdings Pty Ltd [GWCH],

Christopher Thornton, Director PTS and Managing Director Great Western Manufacturing.

At the outset, after introductions, Mr Butler said he would read from a document [which he referred to as his script] providing the requested overview and the deficiencies. At the end of the meeting the PTS request for a copy of the document was refused. PTS pointed out that they would then have to rely on their notes in preparing this response.

The first column of the enclosed table titled 'PTS Evaluation Feedback from DMO – Deficiencies' tabulates what was read to PTS and includes some other DMO input and any explanation PTS sought at

the meeting. PTS had stated that they had come to listen and understand the basis for the decision; that they would not argue [though failure to argue should not be taken as agreement] and that they would subsequently reply in writing. This reply is recorded in the second column of the table; PTS comments form the third column.

The other questions asked by PTS [both prior to and at the meeting] are recorded at the first column of the table titled 'Record of Debrief – PTS Questions'; the second column is the reply by DMO and the third column records PTS comments.

At the meeting PTS asked if they could be provided with their overall evaluation ranking. Mr Le Reveur replied by e-mail after the meeting – “the PTS proposal was ranked 7<sup>th</sup> out of 8 responses when making an overall Value for Money Assessment.” PTS concludes from this that their response passed the initial screening during which 5 of the 13 replies were discarded.

**PTS Evaluation Feedback from DMO - Deficiencies**

DMO Evaluation Feedback	Relevant information provided in PTS's Response to RFP	Further PTS Comment
<p><b>Evaluation Criteria 1 – Past Performance</b></p> <p>Rating: Deficient – Significant</p>		
<p>PTS, MAV, GWM, KDW – No documentation of previous experience in manufacturing or support of defence vehicles.</p>	<p>MAV, PTS' partner has proven experience in the design, prototyping, manufacture and support of protected vehicles which it has supplied to the US Marine Corps. As part of its licence arrangement with PTS, MAV will provide all the necessary support as set out in PTS' response, Volume 1 paragraph 1.5.2 – "MAV provides the vehicle design under a Licence Agreement to PTS as well as product development, prototype production and production support"</p>	<p>Whilst PTS, as a start up company, does not have experience in manufacturing military vehicles, its partner MAV and its Technical Director , Koos de Wet, certainly have extensive experience in the design and manufacture of military vehicles and PTS therefore does not accept this comment.</p>
<p>J F (Koos) de Wet has inadequate armour experience.</p> <p>PTS asked if his stated experience on the Bushmaster was considered. DMO responded that he was only one of a team.</p>	<p>In its response under paragraph 1.5.1 of Volume 1, PTS provided some examples of Mr. de Wet's vehicle armouring experience.</p>	<p>Apparently the information PTS provided was ignored. The comment from DMO that KDW was only one of a team is Thales stock answer. The attached documentation provides clear evidence that KDW was not just "only one of a team" but in fact the leader and chief designer for the re-design of the Bushmaster vehicle. Whilst it may be technically correct to suggest that he was a member of his own team, this</p>

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		<p>comment appears to be designed to understate and diminish his real role as team leader for the re-design of the Bushmaster and the team, most of whom he appointed and directed.</p> <p>He has taken exception to this comment from DMO and will deal with it further separately</p> <p>The competitor Thales' advertisements claim that Hawkei has the DNA of the Bushmaster, yet the shape, construction, materials, automotives and protection systems bear little or no similarity to the Bushmaster, whilst the Protector 2 offered by PTS is very similar indeed in many respects to the Bushmaster which should not come as a surprise as both share a common designer – Koos de Wet</p> <p>Furthermore, PTS believes none of the original Bushmaster design and protection experts have been retained by Thales.</p> <p>Mr de Wet's vehicle armouring experience was believed to be known to DMO and DSTO personnel. If this was not sufficiently clear or helpful to the evaluation team, then the following information may be of interest in this regard:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. All the protected cabs and half cabs fitted to the ADF Unimogs and Macks</li> </ol>
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		<p>used in Afghanistan were to a design patented, developed and blast and ballistically tested by Mr. de Wet in Australia.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2. Mr. de Wet was invited by the prestigious Royal Military College Shrivensham to lecture on light armoured vehicle design and to do a presentation to an invited international audience of Defence professionals on his protected cab and light armoured vehicle design in 2004.</li> <li>3. Please refer to the further information provided in the attached document titled "Koos de Wet – Armour Design and Project Management Capability".</li> </ol> <p>PTS confirms the statements made in PTS Response are accurate and adequate to form a totally different, but factually correct record of Mr de Wet's armouring and vehicle design experience.</p>
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**PTS Evaluation Feedback from DMO**

DMO Evaluation Feedback	Relevant information provided in PTS's Response to RFP	Further PTS Comment
<p><b>Evaluation Criteria 2 – Overall Compliance</b></p> <p>Rating: Deficient - Minor</p> <p>Intellectual Property – adequate</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. PTS confirmed in the covering letter of its Response that it had the exclusive use of the Protector 2 IP in Australia in terms of its exclusive licence agreement with MAV</li> <li>2. ITAR approval for the transfer of the Protector 2 technology was granted to the Technical Director of PTS, Koos de Wet in July 2009 as detailed in Volume 1, paragraph 1.5.2</li> <li>3. In Volume 2 paragraph 1.2.4 PTS confirms Commonwealth access to all licences and technical information relating to the Protector 2</li> <li>4. In the copy of the licence</li> </ol>	<p>All the information required to confirm the IP arrangements was provided.</p>

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	<p>agreement between MAV and PTS it confirms that PTS can make the IP available to the ADF if required.</p>	
<p>Preliminary Planning – failed to show adequate planning</p>	<p>As far as prototype production is concerned, PTS provided its planning in Volume 4 paragraph 4.1.2 and attachments 1 and 2.</p> <p>The Risk Management Overview was detailed in Volume 4 paragraphs 4.1.16 and 4.1.17 and the Risk Assessment and Strategy was detailed in Volume 4, Section 5.</p>	
<p>Did not demonstrate adequacy to supply</p>	<p>In Volume 4 PTS covered its plans for:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. its proposed organizational structure</li> <li>2. its prototype development plan</li> <li>3. its WBS draft</li> <li>4. its Configuration Management (covered in Volume 5)</li> <li>5. managing supply chain risk</li> <li>6. security matters management</li> <li>7. intellectual property management</li> <li>8. Life Cycle Cost management</li> <li>9. Risk Assessment and Strategy</li> </ol>	<p>Considering that serial production is at least 24 months away, PTS believes it has provided sufficient information at this time to provide evidence of its understanding of what will be required and the steps it will take to plan and prepare for serial production at some point in the future for a vehicle which, based on past experience, will likely be very different from the prototypes being produced for trialing and evaluation.</p>

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DMO Evaluation Feedback	Relevant information provided in PTS's Response to RFP	Further PTS Comment
<p><b>Evaluation Criteria 3 – Technical, Functional, Performance Requirements</b></p> <p><b>Rating: Deficient Critical</b></p> <p>Proposal not sufficiently developed, lacking in detail, design goals not supported by evidence.</p>	<p>In PTS's response, Volume 1, paragraph 1.1 it points out that it is offering an Australianised version of the existing Protector 1.</p> <p>The design goals are detailed in Volume 4 paragraph 4.1.1 and the Technical Compliance Matrix in Volume 6 of PTS's Response.</p> <p>The prototype development and blast and ballistic testing programmes were described in Volume 4 paragraph 4.1.2</p>	<p>PTS can advise that the blast and ballistic test and development programme objectives have already been met in accordance with the project planning contained in its Response.</p>
<p>ROPS response not compliant.</p> <p>PTS's offer does not meet the side slope requirement.</p>	<p>In the Technical Compliance Matrix in Volume 6 of PTS's Response it clearly states that the P2 will comply with the roll over protection requirements as contained in DEF (AUST) 8198 or equivalent.</p> <p>In the Technical Compliance Matrix in Volume 6 of PTS's Response it clearly states that the P2 actually has sideslope capability at the upper limit of the stated requirement, quote: "40% @GVM".</p>	
<p><b>Evaluation Criteria 4 – Nature &amp; Extent – Risks to Commonwealth / Capacity to meet Requirements</b></p> <p><b>Rating: Deficient Significant</b></p> <p>Medium risk strategy, Prototypes – relatively unproven</p>	<p>In PTS's response, Volume 1 paragraph 1.1 it points out that it is offering an Australianised version of the existing Protector 1. This was done because it reduced the risks significantly as the basic P1 platform had already been blast and ballistically protected but needed modifications to better</p>	<p>PTS can advise that the blast and ballistic test and development programme objectives have already been met in accordance with the project planning contained in its Response.</p> <p>See also picture included of the development state</p>

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	<p>meet the PMV-L requirements.</p> <p>The prototype development and blast and ballistic testing programmes were described in Volume 4 paragraph 4.1.2</p>	<p>of the 6-man prototype unit, completion of which is scheduled for July 31, 2010.</p> <p>Koos de Wet has is highly experienced in landmine and ballistically protected vehicle design and development so the risks associated with the P2 development should be far lower than with competitive vehicles.</p> <p>Also, PTS has access to higher and more advanced ballistic and blast protection technology (if required) through its partner, MAV so it does not accept DMO's view on the matter</p>
No reference to recognized standards	<p>The blast and ballistic levels were described in the response. Because the blast levels were higher than the minimum STANAG levels these were described in TNT blast equivalent level.</p> <p>Details of the project team, embedded in the manufacturer were supplied.</p>	
Does not identify tools, database to be used, risk content, communication lines	<p>By using an existing blast and ballistically tested platform (Protector 1) as the basis for developing the Australianised Protector 2 version (refer Volume 1 paragraph 1.1) PTS already starts off with a low risk (but not fully PMV-L compliant) existing product for its further development.</p> <p>Furthermore, MAV under Koos de Wet's direction was already far advanced with the development of the Protector 2 at the time of submission of PTS's Response and the development programme to completion of the development was set out in Volume 4 paragraph 4.1.2</p>	
Failed to identify technical risks		<p>Whatever the technical risks were that DMO's evaluation experts identified, these were certainly not encountered as the design, development and certification testing of the Protector 2 is nearing completion in accordance with the programme provided to the Commonwealth. And no unexpected or untoward problems were encountered along the way.</p>

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<p>Systems Engineering Management Plan (SEMP) non compliant/not acceptable</p>	<p>1. According to ATTACHMENT A of the RFP, only a <b>Draft</b> Systems Engineering Management Plan (SEMP) was required at this time.</p> <p>2. MAV who are responsible for the Engineering on the Protector 2 have been using the procedure PTS submitted as a Draft SEMP for their US DoD contracts and if this does not satisfy DMO requirements, certainly during the prototype stage then PTS is of course willing to address any deficiencies identified by DMO.</p> <p>3. From past experience PTS also knows that the prototype design procedure more often than not does not strictly fit into a formal SEMP and the SEMP only comes into play once prototype testing and evaluation has been completed and the Advanced Engineering Model has been finalized and the pre-production point has been reached</p>
<p>Gradeability was not compliant</p>	<p>In the Technical Compliance Matrix in Volume 6 of PTS's Response it clearly states that the P2 has gradeability in excess of the stated requirement, quote: "&gt;60% at GVM, 40% at GCM (O)"</p>
<p>C4I information not provided/not compliant</p>	<p>In the PROTECTOR 2 MAJOR SPECIFICATION AND MASS MATRIX (Page 13 of 27 of Volume 6) PTS stated that it was offering the state of the art quote: "<b>Northrop Grumman CB 2 C4I package</b>".</p>

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**PTS Evaluation Feedback from DMO**

DMO Evaluation Feedback	Relevant information provided in PTS's Response to RFP	Further PTS Comment
<p><b>Evaluation Criteria 5 – Proposed Financial Capability, Technical, etc</b></p> <p>Rating: Deficient - Significant</p>		
<p>PTS unable to demonstrate skills, resources, etc</p>	<p>PTS provided information in Volume 1 of its Response of the structure of PTS, the skills and experience of its staff and management, the experience, resources and the support to be provided by MAV, its partner and licensor of the P2 technology and details of GWM, its facilities, procedures and resources.</p>	<p>PTS believes it has provided sufficient evidence that it has the necessary resources, facilities and skills to deliver this project successfully and would be interested to learn on what basis it was deemed to be unable to deliver this project.</p>
<p>Financial Viability difficult to establish.</p> <p>ALR said that PTS's Response stated that GWCH had net assets of \$200 million and annual revenue of \$85 million. He stated that this was at variance to the position disclosed in that company's Financial Report. (ALR)</p> <p>DMO stated this information was deliberately misleading. (KB)</p>	<p>The PTS Response at Volume 1, page 9, Paragraph 1.3.1 states that "GWCH ... manages net assets in excess of \$200 million and annual revenues exceeding \$85 million.</p>	<p>The statement is clear and correct.</p> <p>GWCH supplied (as it was asked) a copy of its Financial Report which conforms to the requirements of the Corporation Act and as lodged with ASIC and as disclosed in note 1 to those accounts. They are not consolidated (group) accounts but the accounts of that company only. It's investment in subsidiaries are valued at cost or \$7.275 million, whilst the net assets of those subsidiaries total \$52</p>

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		<p>million. GWCH group net assets exceed \$75 million.</p> <p>In addition GWCH manages assets for its shareholding entities which are in addition to the assets within GWCH. When these assets are added to GWCH group net assets, the total exceeds \$200 million.</p> <p>PTS's statement is accurate. Any uncertainty DMO had about the word "manages" could have been resolved by consulting PTS.</p> <p>The assertion that the statement is misleading and incorrect and not based on fact.</p>
<p>Capability / Capacity</p> <p>PTS/GW has no track record and experience with military contracts</p>	<p>PTS is a start up company, but its partner MAV and Technical Director, Koos de Wet have many years of experience in designing, developing, industrializing and supporting military vehicles. Refer Volume 1</p>	<p>For DMO to say that PTS does not have a track record or experience with military contracts would be technically correct but would ignore the extensive experience of its licensor and technical director who have many years of experience between them and who are integral to PTS's operation. Has this judgment been applied equally to the rest of the respondents and the short listed companies?</p>

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<p>J F (Koos) de Wet's project management experience is seriously deficient.</p>	<p>In paragraph 1.4 of Volume 4 of its response, PTS provided a number of examples of military vehicle projects Mr. de Wet initiated and saw through to production or corrected or re-designed under contract (such as the Bushmaster) and assisted with industrialization covering a period of more than 30 years.</p>	<p>The evaluation may not have considered this information properly.</p> <p>As far as Mr de Wet's design and project management involvement with the troubled Bushmaster project is concerned, it should be pointed out that Mr. de Wet provided a report on the Bushmaster project from its inception and the problems associated with this vehicle project to the Mortimer Committee reviewing the ADF's acquisition systems.</p> <p>Mr Andrews also cites significant project management experience including as CEO of Ports Corporation of Queensland which during his 10 year tenure completed 3 major infrastructure programs with total works exceeding \$500 million within budget, on time, and providing the required functionality.</p>
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**PTS Evaluation Feedback from DMO**

DMO Evaluation Feedback	Relevant information provided in PTS's Response to RFP	Further PTS Comment
<p><b>Evaluation Criteria 6 – Indicative Prices / Pricing Structure</b></p> <p><b>Rating: Deficient - Critical</b></p> <p>Omissions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ key cost elements missing</li> <li>○ profit expectations</li> <li>○ contingency in pricing</li> <li>○ pricing unable to be validated</li> <li>○ no payment regime</li> </ul> <p>PTS's offer did not include separate pricing for prototypes.</p>	<p>In Volume 3, Section 2 of its Response, PTS confirmed the price assumptions contained in the indicative prices it provided.</p> <p>A cash flow forecast for the production contract was not provided as there was no confirmed delivery programme specified by DMO on which to base a cash flow forecast.</p>	<p>PTS is satisfied that the pricing information it provided is realistic for the products it offered and reliable within the limits and guidelines provided by DMO.</p>
	<p>In the Addendum to Volume 3 of its submission, Paragraph 1.1, Indicative Prototype Pricing, PTS confirms the following quote: "We herewith confirm the indicative pricing for the supply of 6 prototypes in the variants specified at a price of \$8, 118,125 exclusive of GST in accordance with the prototype program set out at paragraph 2.1 of Volume 4." This price includes all simulations,</p>	<p>PTS notes that the offered prices compare favourably with the reported price of \$9 million for 2 prototypes offered to Thales, FPI, and General Dynamics</p>

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	<p>all blast and certification testing, ballistic testing, prototype building, durability testing and delivery to the ADF and whether the costs are allocated per prototype or not, the total remains the same for the 6 prototypes specified.</p>	
<p>PTS's offer did not include production prices for the variants.</p>	<p>In Volume 3 of its Response in the table PROTECTOR 2 MAJOR SPECIFICATIONS AND ROM PRICE MATRIX the following ROM production prices excluding GST were provided for the production vehicles together with their applicable specifications:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Command Vehicle - \$527584.00</li> <li>2. Liaison Vehicle - \$527584.00</li> <li>3. Utility Vehicle - \$518484.00</li> <li>4. Reconnaissance Vehicle - \$540584.00</li> </ol> <p>According to ATTACHMENT A, PROPOSAL DATA REQUIREMENTS LIST, PROPOSAL Data Requirement Number D-1 of the RFP, an Indicative Price Schedule had to be provided. We submit that the above quoted information not only fully satisfies this requirement but is also well within the 20% tolerance provided for in the RFP.</p>	
<p>PTS's offer did not include Trailer prices</p>	<p>This information was contained in Volume 7 of PTS's response, quote: "Indicative price per unit for 1300 units - \$18410-00 nett each excluding GST. Australian Content – 100%".</p>	

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<p><b>Evaluation Criteria 7 – Proposed Schedule</b></p> <p>Rating: Deficient - Significant</p>		
<p>Claimed compliance</p>	<p>PTS's indicated production schedule and the assumptions and conditions upon which this was based is set out in Volume 4, Paragraph 2.2</p>	<p>This schedule is based on the specifications having been finalized and the data pack being ready at the time of contract signature. This allows a clear 3 month period for the delivery of the first 4 units which is very low for a project like this. Also, the build up in production is deliberately slow to bed down the manufacturing process, only reaching full production after 11 months which is very low for a project such as this as your manufacturing experts will confirm.</p>
<p>No evidence of rigour</p>		<p>The PTS production programme is a carefully considered programme as outlined above and takes into account lessons Koos de Wet learnt from the Bushmaster project.</p>
<p>Work breakdown / structure poorly developed</p>	<p>The WBS and all the associated activities including the risk analyses were included in Volume 4, Section 4.1</p>	<p>Considering the prototype nature of the vehicle at this time, PTS would be interested to learn in what respects the WBS was poorly developed as the prototype is nearing completion at this</p>

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<p>Discrepancies with Prototyping and Protection:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Prototype schedule not compliant/unacceptable</li> <li>2. Prototype schedule not acceptable or sufficiently detailed to produce the quoted outcomes.</li> <li>3. The Protection requirements were not complied with and no supporting empirical information was provided.</li> </ol>		<p>time, largely based on the WBS included in the PTS response.</p>
<p>In its Response to the RFP, PTS confirmed the following in 4.1.2 of Volume 4, quote: "MAV has already begun the process of designing and building prototype vehicles under the design leadership of Kooos de Wet and under contract to PTS for the Land 121 PMV-L programme. In order to be able to deliver six prototype vehicles under a Prototype Development Contract for a self-imposed 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter 2010 deadline, it was deemed necessary for certain preliminary actions to be initiated prior to award. PTS has taken the position that the best all round offer including the best designed vehicle family is most likely to be successful in winning the contract, and with confidence has started making the necessary preparations for production of the Protector 2 in Queensland should PTS be successful with this contract. A redesign of a current product line is already well underway.</p> <p>At this time, the redesign of the Protector I hull and componentry is well advanced. Ballistic and blast testing is well under way and a mock up hull is being prepared for blast testing to take place shortly. While PTS's RFP submittal is being reviewed and evaluated by</p>		<p>PTS confirms the following against its above response:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Between MAV and PTS they have access to all the required protection technologies required for PMV-L including future developments.</li> <li>2. Confirmation ballistic testing (including AP protection) was successfully completed last quarter 2009</li> <li>3. Center blast testing to Stanag 4569 Levels 2 and 3 were successfully completed in February 2010.</li> <li>4. Front wheel blasting to level 3+ (9.1kg TNT) completed in February 2010</li> <li>5. Front wheel blasting to level 2 scheduled for July 2010</li> <li>6. PTS is well ahead of its quoted prototype development programme as contained in its Response with the result that the risks involved in meeting the schedule or the specs have to a very large extent already been discounted.</li> <li>7. a Representative Prototype is nearing completion at this moment – see photograph of prototype included with this response</li> </ol>

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	<p>the Commonwealth, these efforts will continue. PTS fully intends to have deliverable prototype vehicles at TRL level 6 available prior to the end of July 2010 provided a firm order is received for these vehicles by no later than November 30, 2009".</p>	
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**PTS Evaluation Feedback from DMO**

DMO Evaluation Feedback	Relevant information provided in PTS's Response to RFP	Further PTS Comment
<p><b>Evaluation Criteria 8 – Work Performed in Australia</b></p> <p><b>Rating: Deficient - Critical</b></p> <p>Incomplete – did not address trailers</p>	<p>The locally designed trailers were covered in Volume 7 of PTS's response and prices were provided for them too. Being locally designed and manufactured they have 100% Australian content. Since trailers were not to be acquired for the prototype phase, PTS did not treat the trailers as a priority at the time of submitting its Response.</p>	<p>Since submission of its Response to the RFP, PTS has been offered a licence for the local manufacture of an excellent in service US Army off road trailer which is ideal for this application as at a very similar price to that indicated in PTS's response.</p>
<p>Level claimed cannot be evaluated</p> <p>The local content information was not compliant/inadequate/incomplete.</p>	<p>PTS has advised both its calculated level of Australian content and specified the items which are not local content. An evaluation of the claimed level was possible by estimating the value of the specified items and compared this to the total value.</p> <p>Based on the advice provided by DMO that all materials, services and components sourced from locally based suppliers that are locally registered, are totally independent of the respondents and are registered tax payers are deemed Australian Content.</p> <p>On this basis it then follows that all materials/components/ systems/services</p>	<p>PTS's evaluation concluded that the level of Australian content exceeded 89%. PTS stands by this claim.</p>

Note: All references are to the complete set of PTS Response documents Volume 1 through 7 inclusive as delivered in accordance with the RFP requirement.

	<p>imported via other channels are not Australian Content and therefore by subtracting the non-Australian content from the final price, the balance is then Australian content as per the above definition.</p> <p>Unless the Commonwealth has changed its position on the way the Australian content is calculated, then <b>PTS is satisfied that the Australian content percentages it calculated in accordance with the above and provided in the AUSTRALIAN CONTENT CALCULATION in Volume 4 as follows are indeed correct:</b></p> <table data-bbox="686 963 821 1400"> <tr> <td>Command Variant</td> <td>-</td> <td>89.3%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Utility Variant</td> <td>-</td> <td>89.1%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Liaison Variant</td> <td>-</td> <td>89.3%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Reconnaissance Variant-</td> <td></td> <td>89.6%</td> </tr> </table>	Command Variant	-	89.3%	Utility Variant	-	89.1%	Liaison Variant	-	89.3%	Reconnaissance Variant-		89.6%	
Command Variant	-	89.3%												
Utility Variant	-	89.1%												
Liaison Variant	-	89.3%												
Reconnaissance Variant-		89.6%												

## **Koos deWet – Armour Design and Project Management Capability**

Attachment to document titled “PTS Evaluation Feedback from DMO – Deficiencies”

The reference to Mr deWet’s experience in the PTS Response were apparently not accepted at face value. PTS stands by the accuracy of its statements in the Response and has sort external documentary evidence of Mr deWet’s capability.

To this end we attach:

1. Hansard including statements that KDW was team leader.
2. Page 205 from the book “Breaking Free – the official history of ADI” including statement that “Success in building up this field of activity was largely attributable to Koos de Wet, a South African designer of military vehicles who joined the company in November 1996. The specialist skills and knowledge in landmine protection which he possessed enabled him to develop the Bushmaster in less than 8 months, commencing the task on 29 January and completing it on 17 September 1997. In addition to his vision of creating a family of ‘specialist’ military vehicles, he also devised a vehicle uniquely adapted to fighting bushfires.”
3. Media Report – Australian Defence Report – 13 November 1997
4. Patent Application No: PCT/AU2003/001658
5. US Patent Application No: D/114,227
6. Course Programme from Royal Military College, Shrivenham noting presentation from Koos de Wet on “Protected truck cab variants and Australian developments in light armoured systems”
7. Agenda, United States – Australia, Senior National Representative (Army), Topic: Soldier Systems Technologies – Presentation by Koos de Wet on Vehicle Landmine / Ballistic in May 2003

## ADJOURNMENT

**Madam DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mrs Kelly)**—It being 12.30 p.m., I propose the question: That the committee do now adjourn.

### **Australian Defence Industries Ltd**

**Mr GIBBONS (Bendigo)** (12.30 p.m.)—Mr Deputy Speaker, I am delighted to inform you that last night the Australian Army placed an order for 341 Bushmaster armoured personnel carriers with the Australian Defence Industries plant in Bendigo. This vehicle was designed and built in Bendigo and this contract, which is worth \$200 million, will create 40 new jobs initially with the potential for further positions, not only with ADI but with the many contractors from central Victoria that will participate in this project.

*Mr Price interjecting—*

**Mr GIBBONS**—The Army recently completed testing the Bushmaster and a South African designed vehicle, with the Bendigo designed machine showing its superiority in every aspect of the tests. This follows on from the successful Flyer vehicle, also designed and built in Bendigo, which is already in production. They also have a high-speed engineering vehicle which is being dubbed ‘the tractor on steroids’, 27 of which are already in service.

The Bushmaster high-tech vehicle can comfortably transport nine personnel in a high degree of comfort and safety in almost any conditions. It has a range of over 1,000 kilometres and travels at speeds in excess of 110 kilometres per hour. ADI informed me that the vehicle is manufactured from specially developed Australian steel using ADI specialist welding process. Its monocoque hull provides both ballistic and mine blast protection.

## REPRESENTATIVES MAIN COMMITTEE

### REPRESENTATIVES

3870 MAIN COMMITTEE Thursday, 11 March 1999

Its fuel and hydraulic oil tanks are located outside the crew compartment to protect the occupants from possible fires due to rupturing in the event of a mine blast. The fuel tank is also fitted with fire retardant elements that prevent the explosion or deterioration of the fuel. The Bushmaster has a 270-litre drinking water tank located under the crew compartment which also contributes to the occupants’ safety in the event of a landmine explosion.

The potential of this vehicle is staggering, having both military and civilian applications.

ADI Bendigo already has a firefighting appliance version of this vehicle on the drawing board, as well as a cash carry vehicle and several other commercial and military applications.

Winning this contract is the most exciting news for Bendigo in decades and it has been achieved in spite of the Howard government’s ideology, rather than because of it. We saw one of the most blatant pieces of political dishonesty ever on Thursday, 15 February 1996, a few short weeks before the federal election of that year, when John Howard said in Bendigo, ‘No, no, and no, we have no plans to privatise ADI.’ This pre-election commitment was broken halfway through the Howard government’s first term, thereby betraying the people of Bendigo in the most callous and dishonest manner and no doubt was a major factor in Labor’s win at the last election. I congratulate Mr Koos de Wet, the head of the ADI Bendigo design team, and all personnel involved in the design and manufacture of the prototype vehicles.

Winning this contract is a powerful endorsement of the generations of Bendigo people who have built up ADI and made it the first-class facility that it is today. This is great news for Bendigo and for Australian heavy vehicle manufacturing and proves that Australian defence manufacturing can provide substantial economic benefits to regional Australia.



the Steyr production had been reached and the last of 75,674 weapons handed over to the Army,<sup>51</sup> with the facility being reduced to core personnel only.<sup>52</sup> In the event something of a reprieve was gained early in June 1995 when a new order for 4207 Minimi light machine guns was obtained from Army which would carry the facility into late 1997.<sup>53</sup>

Property development was another area that began encountering significant problems. The planned redevelopments of Maribyrnong and Footscray were able to proceed without much difficulty, due largely to the sympathetic approvals procedure that operated in Victoria.<sup>54</sup> After the Lend Lease Corporation was signed on as development partner in June 1995, detailed planning commenced for the subdivision, construction, infrastructure and marketing of the two sites. By the time the estate at Maribyrnong (given the name Waterford Green) was officially opened on 20 February 1998, nearly 300 of the 540 residential blocks available there had been sold, some homes were completed and the area's first residents had already moved in.<sup>55</sup> Elsewhere, at St. Marys, the idea of returning unused real estate to public uses had run into obstruction and delay, held hostage to a cumbersome process, minority pressure groups and political manoeuvring.

Other of the company's traditional sites were also in trouble, with the marine engineering and heavy engineering facilities at Garden Island and Bendigo respectively both faced with serious downturns in business. The former had won a contract to refit HMAS *Manoora*, one of two ex-US Navy tank landing ships acquired for the RAN, but ADI missed out on the more lucrative job of converting both these vessels to training and helicopter support ships. A bout of retrenchments at Garden Island followed, although the board acknowledged that cutbacks in the workforce there would have been necessary in any event in view of the reduction in the volume of work entering the dockyard.<sup>56</sup> Competition between the large number of dockyards around Australia, and Navy practices which allowed 'tin shed' contractors to operate at the fleet base at Garden Island because of their ability to tender low for work, meant that ADI's workforce there had fallen to about 430 by the early in 1998.<sup>57</sup>

The Bendigo facility also found itself in the doldrums, reflecting the fact that heavy engineering – by nature an industry of high peaks and low troughs anyway – was in general decline across Australia.<sup>58</sup> Here, however, the gloomy picture was relieved by the company's success in building a new business in military and specialist vehicles. What had begun as an initial response to a requirement stated by the Army in 1994 for a light engineer tractor capable of moving long distances at convoy speed had grown a couple of years later into a small group of products which held good prospects of success both in Australia and overseas. The first of the ADI vehicles, known as the High Speed Engineering Vehicle, combined a 100 kph road speed with outstanding cross country performance, four wheel drive and the earth moving capability of a tractor; as well as back hoe and front end loader functions, it had fork lift, light crane and drilling capabilities.<sup>59</sup> Interest in the

vehicle expanded from the local requirement, resulting in an order during 1997 for a test vehicle for the Canadian Defence Force even before the Australian Army placed its order for 27 HSEVs early in 1998.<sup>60</sup>

Another Army project, Mulgara, gave rise to ADI's second specialist vehicle, the Flyer. After the Army stated its requirement as being for a fast, highly mobile vehicle for use in surveillance and reconnaissance operations in the remote and rugged conditions of northern Australia, ADI teamed up with a Californian company with experience in producing off-road racing vehicles. With an appearance resembling a dune buggy, the Flyer's 100 kw diesel engine gave it a top speed of more than 130 kph and an ability to carry more than a tonne of gear across the most difficult terrain.<sup>61</sup> By the end of 1996 the first overseas contract for 29 of these vehicles had been received and was being met for a south-east Asian country. Although another regional customer also placed an order for these vehicles, the Australian Army cancelled the \$250 million Project Mulgara in October 1997 without making a selection of type.<sup>62</sup>

Finally, the company entered into the competition to tender for a large number (expected then to be 455, later reduced to a minimum of 340) of armoured infantry mobility vehicles for the Army under Project Bushranger. The initial ADI solution was rejected for selection to the Army's shortlist in June 1995,<sup>63</sup> but this disastrous situation was retrieved when the company bought the rights to the Bushmaster vehicle produced by Perry Engineering, a subsidiary of Boral Limited, and proceeded to heavily redesign it. Using a Caterpillar six-cylinder turbo diesel engine and an Allison seven-speed automatic transmission, the Bushmaster could meet the Army requirement for eight different variants. These ranged from the standard version able to carry nine soldiers (including the driver) in air conditioned comfort over long distances, to others adapted for use as ambulances, command posts, recovery vehicles, mortar carriers and so on. With this design ADI became one of the two contenders for the Army contract in early 1998.

Success in building up this field of activity was largely attributable to Koos de Wet, a South African designer of military vehicles who joined the company in November 1996. The specialist skills and knowledge in landmine protection which he possessed enabled him to develop the Bushmaster design in less than eight months, commencing the task on 29 January and completing it on 17 September 1997. In addition to his vision of creating a 'family' of specialist military vehicles, he also began looking at non-military opportunities and by 1998 had also devised a vehicle uniquely adapted to fighting bushfires.<sup>64</sup>

Other new openings were pursued in the electronics field, reflecting the belief that ADI's future increasingly lay in systems development and application. In pursuing this goal, the former UDS facility in Perth became a crucial centre of activity and produced some notable achievements. In 1995, for example, a command support system required for use in the ADF's major exercise in the Kangaroo series later that same year was supplied at short notice. The system was

## ADI recruited South African expert

The considerable redesign of the ADI Bushmaster vehicle is understood to have been carried under the direction of a South African, Mr Koos de Wet, who was recruited by ADI to ensure that its bid was compliant.

Mr De Wet is believed to have run his own business for five years in South Africa and earlier worked for Reumech who are linked with ANI in the rival bid by ASVS of the Taipan.

Australian DEFENCE REPORT queried whether it is permissible to alter a design after tenders close (which was in mid 1996). However we have been assured by the Australian Defence Force that this is permitted provided the fundamental specifications and price are not changed.

ADR also has been told that ASVS redesigned its gear box in the Taipan after the tenders closed, and there was nothing improper in the company doing that.

At the time of going to press the Australian Defence Force was awaiting the go-ahead from the Deputy Secretary - Acquisition, Mr Garry Jones for contract signatures so that the field trials could proceed, and the production contract agreed.

Once this happens the two aspirants have 24 weeks to produce three vehicles each for the trials, which were listed to run for 12 months, although we understand the Australian Army would like to shorten the trial period, and thus make up for the considerable time lost so far.

## \$4m international flight training contracts

BAe Flight Training Australia has secured new international contracts valued at \$4m to train pilots at its Tamworth facility in Northern New South Wales.

These contracts build on two previous major successes announced earlier this year, and include for the first time ab-initio pilots from Vietnam Airlines.

In winning the contract for Vietnam airlines British Aerospace Flight Training Australia beat off stiff international competition from Boeing Flight Safety (USA), SEFA (France) and the Australian Aviation College (Adelaide) in a formal tender process. The 16 Vietnam students will begin training in Tamworth.

Mr Brian Parsons, Director and General Manager British Aerospace Flight Training, said that these new contracts reinforce the company's reputation as a leading provider of quality training services on an international scale.

## ADI launches Bushmaster

From previous page

Bushmaster is required to carry food rations for three days and a cooled water drinking system. ADI has put in place a comprehensive national support program for it.

Harris said ADI would be committed to achieving a 70% Australian industry involvement (AII) if successful in winning the contract. ADI would maximise the use of Australian subcontractors and request overseas suppliers to have their sub-contracts met by their Australian offices.

Even based on official statements in the middle of last year, the trials were to start on December 15, 1996, so by the time they may get going, the project will be running about 18 months late.

This appears to disregard one of the objectives of the Government's Defence Reform Program which is to speed up project decision making and implementation.

There is considerable concern that Defence major and minor capital equipment projects seem to be over cautiously process managed rather than outcome management driven. Further there is growing frustration within at least some sections of Defence that at some critical top levels there is a distinct reluctance to delegate authority to keep initiatives, project evaluation, analysis and decision-making moving at a steady pace.

To some degree, given the difficulties experienced in major projects like the new COLLINS submarine combat system integration, the Jindalee Operation Radar Network, and now the cancellation of the Army's MULGARA surveillance/reconnaissance project, some caution is understandable. The general feeling, however is that in most cases it is very much overdone.

At the same time it appears that Cabinet is so weighed with a number of difficult issues, that consideration of some key Defence projects awaiting a further tick by the Government are delayed by weeks if not months.

It is perhaps of more than passing interest that Mr Arch Bevis, the former Parliamentary Secretary for Defence, now the Shadow Defence Minister, said in a recent speech that the time taken to select a successful (Defence) tenderer is often outrageously long. Mind you, there are those who would counter that in government he did not seem to be able to do much about it either.

"We operate in a highly competitive market and this recent success further demonstrates that we offer world-standard training packages in terms of quality, content and price," he said.

Reinforcing this latest success, British Aerospace Flight Training Australia has been shortlisted as a potential supplier for the Australian Defence Force Tri Service Flight Training contract. This multi-million dollar contract, which runs for an initial six year period is likely to include basic Flight Training and Flight Screening for all three services.

British Aerospace Flight Training Australia has airline customers from countries around the world including Japan, China, Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan and Australia. Courses are designed to provide a total package combining academic knowledge and practical skills to prepare trainees for potential command of modern transport aircraft.

BAe Flight Training Australia currently conducts basic Flight Training for the Australia Regular Army and Flight Screening for the Airforce, Navy and Australia Defence Force Academy - activities which have been carried out since 1992.

## ADF pay rise

All ADF Permanent and Reserve Force members have won a pay rise as part of the Productivity Based Remuneration Arrangement: 1997-99.

The Defence Force Remuneration Tribunal's recent ruling provides for salary adjustments of 2.5% from October 30, 1.5% from the first pay period after April 1, 1998, and 2% from the pay period after October 1, 1998.

They will also apply to pay related allowances. The increases are the first major negotiated salary arrangements in the Australian Government employment area under the current round of workplace bargaining.

Pub. No.: WO/2004/053421 International Application No.: PCT/AU2003/001658  
Publication Date: 24.06.2004 International Filing Date: 12.12.2003  
Chapter 2 Demand Filed: 12.07.2004

IPC: F41H 7/04 (2006.01)

Applicants: VALIR PTY LTD [AU/AU]; PO Box 751, Strathfieldsaye, Victoria 3551 (AU) (All Except US).  
DE WET, Jacobus, Francois [ZA/AU]; (AU) (US Only).


Inventor: DE WET, Jacobus, Francois; (AU).

Agent: DI GIANTOMASSO, Donato, Franco; Knightsbridge Patent Attorneys, Level 8, Citibank Centre, 350 Collins Street, Melbourne, Victoria 3000 (AU).

Priority Data: 2002953287 12.12.2002 AU

Title: PROTECTIVE APPARATUS FOR VEHICLES

Abstract: The invention provides a protective apparatus for a vehicle, the apparatus comprising a structure of generally convex shape adapted to be fitted to or to form part of a vehicle, wherein: (a) the protective apparatus is capable of resisting a force applied to the structure; and (b) the apex of the apparatus is disposed generally in a direction that is opposed to the direction of travel or movement of the force applied to the apparatus.



Designated States: AE, AG, AL, AM, AT, AU, AZ, BA, BB, BG, BR, BW, BY, BZ, CA, CH, CN, CO, CR, CU, CZ, DE, DK, DM, DZ, EC, EE, EG, ES, FI, GB, GD, GE, GH, GM, HR, HU, ID, IL, IN, IS, JP, KE, KG, KP, KR, KZ, LC, LK, LR, LS, LT, LU, LV, MA, MD, MG, MK, MN, MW, MX, MZ, NO, NZ, PH, PL, PT, RO, RU, SD, SE, SG, SI, SK, SL, TJ, TM, TR, TT, TZ, UA, UG, US, UZ, VN, YU, ZA, ZW.  
African Regional Intellectual Property Org. (ARIPO) (BW, GH, GM, KE, LS, MW, MZ, SD, SL, SZ, TZ, UG, ZM, ZW)  
Eurasian Patent Organization (EAPO) (AM, AZ, BY, KG, KZ, MD, RU, TJ, TM)  
European Patent Office (EPO) (AT, BE, BG, CH, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IT, LU, MC, NL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, TR)  
African Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI) (BF, BJ, CF, CG, CI, CM, GA, GN, GQ, GW, ML, MR, NE, SN, TD, TG).

Publication Language: English (EN)

Filing Language: English (EN)

FIG. 1.





FIG. 5.






FIG. 2.




FIG. 3.




FIG. 4.

**Inventor:** De Wet  
**Date Issued:** April 24, 2001  
**Application:** D/114,227  
**Filed:** November 22, 1999  
**Inventors:** De Wet, Jacobus Francois (Koois) (Bendigo, AU)  
**Assignee:** Adi Ltd (Bendigo, AU)  
**Primary Examiner:** Cadmus; Stacia  
**Assistant Examiner:**  
**Attorney Or Agent:** Larson & Taylor PLC  
**U.S. Class:** D12/12  
**Field Of Search:** ; D12/12; D12/400; 89/36.08; 89/36.01; 89/36.02; 89/36.09; 89/36.13; 89/40.03  
**International Class:**  
**U.S Patent Documents:** 4326445  
**Foreign Patent Documents:** 131517  
**Other References:**



**DRAFT PROGRAMME**  
**SURVIVABILITY OF LIGHT ARMoured VEHICLES**

**6 - 8 December 2004**

*The aim of the course is to provide an understanding of how armoured vehicles might be designed to be both lighter and more survivable on the battlefield.*

**Monday 6 December First Day**

09.00	Assemble, Register and Coffee	<b>Armoured Fighting Vehicle Wing</b>
09.15	Welcome	Col (Retd) M E C Coombs
	<i>Context</i>	
09.30 - 11.00	Armour Systems & Impact of Mines on AFV Design	Professor R M Ogorkiewicz
11.00 - 1130	Coffee	
	<i>Threat</i>	
11.30 - 12.15	KE & CE Threat Weapons	Dr D Allsop
12.15 - 13.00	KE Ammunition Design	Professor Dr M Held
13.00 - 13.45	Lunch - Roberts Hall	
13.45 - 14.45	Shaped Charge Threat and Warhead Design for Frontal Attack (Worst Case)	Professor Dr M Held
	<i>Defence Systems</i>	
14.45 - 16.00	Passive Armour: Terminal Effects	Dr Ian Horsfall
16.00 - 16.30	Tea	
16.30 - 17.00	Signature Management	Anders Kristoffersson Saab Barracuda

**Tuesday 7 December Second Day**

09.00 - 09.30	Developments of Reactive Armour	Professor Dr M Held
09.30 - 10.00	Active Protection Systems	Professor R M Ogorkiewicz
10.00 - 10.45	<b>Development methodology and blast testing of universal 'quick swap' protected truck cabs</b>	<b>Koos de Wet</b>
10.45 - 11.15	Coffee	
	<i>Further threats &amp; countermeasures</i>	
11.15 - 12.15	Shaped Charge and EFP design for non-frontal attack	Professor Dr M Held
12.15 - 13.00	Behind Armour Effects and recent Spall Liner developments for Armour Protection	Dr Ian Horsfall



Buffet Lunch in Tank Hangars

14.00 - 14.45	Electric Armour	Dr Bryn James, DSTL
14.45 - 15.30	<b>Protected truck cab variants and Australian developments in light armoured systems</b>	<b>Koos de Wet</b>
15.30 - 16.00	Tea in Engineer Hall <i>A sanity check</i>	
16.00 - 17.00	Fight Heavy: Logistic Issues for Rapidly Deployable AFVs	Professor J G Hetherington, RMCS
19.00	Depart by bus for Queens Arms Hotel, East Garston	
19.30	Pre Supper Drinks	
20.00	Supper	
22.00	Return to RMCS / Hotels	

**Wednesday 8 December**     **Third Day**  
*The Future*

09.00 - 10.00	Mine Protection of Light Armoured Vehicles	Dr Vernon Joynt
10.00 - 10.45	Directed Energy Weapon (DEW) & Electro Magnetic Pulse (EMP) Protection	Mr S Dowling, RMCS
10.45 - 11.15	Coffee	
11.15 - 12.15	Composite Materials for Future AFVs	Dr Mark French, QinetiQ
12.15 - 13.00	Mine protection for VIP Transport	Dr Vernon Joynt
13.00	Course closure	Col (Retd) M E C
Coombs,		Course Director
1400	CVS SYMPOSIUM OPENS (Lunch available in WCC from 1300)	Whitworth Conference Centre



**United States - Australia**  
**Senior National Representative (Army)**  
**Theme: Soldier Systems Technologies**  
**Fishermen's Bend**  
**Melbourne, Victoria**



**AGENDA**

**Friday, 9 May 2003 – Medical Technology Discussions/ Demonstrations**  
**Bldg # 436, Maribyrnong, VIC**

0830 - 0900	Depart Hotel for Meeting Site (Business Attire)	
0900 – 0915	Arrival and Welcome	Mike Brennan, Scientific Adviser – Australian Army
0915 – 0945	Advanced Infectious Disease	LTC Dennis Kyle Australian Army Malaria Institute
0945 – 1015	Psychological Stress And Performance (T)	COL Tony Cotton Directorate of Psychology
1015 – 1030	Morning Tea	
1030 - 1100	Physical Training Injuries: Problems/ Interventions	COL Steve Rudzki Directorate Health Capability
1100 – 1200	Open	
1200 – 1330	Lunch off Site at Own Discretion	
1330 – 1400	Material Development (CBRNDC) Combat Uniforms Bio-sensor Technologies	Dr. Brent Paul, DSTO Dr. Graeme Eggleston, DSTO Ralph Leslie, DSTO
1400 – 1430	Physical Training Issues Heat Injury Prevention	Tony Lau, DSTO
1430 – 1500	Medical Countermeasures Infectious Disease Products	Peter Gray, DSTO
1500 – 1515	Afternoon Tea	
1515 – 1530	Wrap-up Discussions/ Depart	

device developed from the intellectual property of three Australian companies (Tenix Defence, Filtronic Components Australia and Lintek Ptd Ltd.) and DSTO. The PRWR will enable individual soldiers to detect and locate GSRs, and identify changes in operation that indicate whether personnel may have been detected. The threat of enemy GSR is of particular concern to the Special Forces in the conduct of their operations. This CTD capability would be an enhancement to soldier protection in the field and would allow them to avoid detection and sudden attack, or complete their operation despite the presence of a GSR.

- High Velocity Liquid Gas Applications  
Polysystems – Tasmania Dr. Norbert Burman, DSTO

An approach to use liquid CO2 to drive projectiles.

	Medical Robotics	Dr. Norbert Burman, DSTO
1500 – 1515	Afternoon Tea	
1515 – 1545	Land Mine Neutralisation Vehicle Hardening RRAMNS CTD	Dr. Norbert Burman, DSTO

The RRAMNS OA concluded that significant operational utility can be achieved by the fusing of various sensor systems and their integration into a blast protected vehicle. Currently, there is no commercially available system that has these characteristics. Whilst the sensor technology is understood, full functionality of a fused sensor system is yet to be achieved. This will be achieved by integrating detection, protection and C3I sub-systems onto a modern mine protected vehicle, with sufficient armour to protect the occupants and internal equipment.

1545 – 1630	Force Protection Issues: Vehicle Landmine/ Ballistic Protection	Koos de Wet, Valir
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The technology offers a practical way of overcoming the problem presented by the flat cab undersurfaces and has now been demonstrated to work successfully when tested in accordance with the latest NATO anti tank mine test specs. The technology can be adapted to developing cabs for in service vehicles such as the FMTV and similar vehicles.

	Combat Identification	TBD, DSTO
1630 - 1700	UAV Development Projects NERVANA	Dr. Anthony Finn – EWRD, DSTO

- Other topics (Future Engine Systems, Joint Theatre Distribution, Low Energy Lasers)

1030 – 1045	Morning Tea	
1045 - 1115	Review Action Items	DGLD, DASA(DEC), CLOD
1115 - 1230	Prepare ADAC Brief/ Final words	DGLD, DASA(DEC), CLOD
1230 - 1330	Lunch	
1330 – 1400	En route to Hotel	
1400 - onward	Personal Time prior to ADAC	

Attendees:

Australian Delegation

BRIG Steve Quinn--Director General Land Development (DGLD), Capability Systems  
 Dr. Warren Harch—Chief, Land Operations Division - Defence Science & Technology  
 Organization (DSTO)  
 COL Steve Salmon—Director, Land Combat Development  
 Dr. Michael Brennan--Scientific Advisor, Australian Army  
 Mr. John Hutchings--PM, Land 125  
 LTC Frank Twarog—Deputy Director, Science and Industry, DGLD

US Delegation

Mr. Craig Hunter--Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports &  
 Cooperation (DASA DEC))  
 COL Thomas Dresen—DASA DEC, Armament Director  
 COL Ted Johnson—Project Manager, Soldier Warrior  
 COL Raj Gupta—Deputy Director MRMC  
 COL Stephen Monks—Director, International Directorate RDE Cmd  
 LTC Matt Warren, DASA DEC, Pacific Desk Officer  
 LTC Carl Hover—Deputy Director, Military Operational Medicine Research Program,  
 MRMC  
 Dr. Greg Mogel—Special Asst to Director of Adv Medicine, MRMC  
 Mr. David Troxel—Deputy PM, Soldier Warrior  
 Ms. Katherine Eltzroth—Deputy Director, Medical Directorate ASAALT  
 LTC Clayton Brown--Commander, US Army Research Development and Standardization  
 Group—Australia  
 LTC John Ashbaugh-- Army Programs Manager, Office of Defense Cooperation  
 LTC Dennis Kyle—Australian Army Malaria Institute

## Record of Debrief – PTS Questions

PTS Questions	DMO Response	PTS Comments
<p>1. Where other proposals were similarly deficient; were the deficiencies determined and dealt with in the same way as they were for PTS? (asked prior to the meeting)</p>	<p>DMO will not comment on the evaluation of other proponents. (KB)  All proponents were dealt with in the same way. (KB)</p>	<p>The reply seems to be questionable.</p>
<p>2. How were Defence Industry Capability Development policies and other relevant policies applied to this decision? (asked prior to the meeting)</p>	<p>They were not considered. DMO relies on its own procedures. (KB)</p>	<p>If the DMO process used did not consider relevant Commonwealth policies, the process and the decision may be at fault.</p>
<p>3. How was the constitutional requirement (chap IV Trade and Finance section 99) for no preference between states met? (asked prior to the meeting)</p>	<p>Not considered. DMO relied on its own procedures. (KB)</p>	<p>If the DMO process used did not consider relevant law, the process and the decision may be at fault.</p>
<p>4. It was stated as a deficiency that PTS had no history, had not mentioned any contracts. In the evaluation is a bad history (such as Thales as in an Auditor General's report) better than no history?</p>	<p>DMO will not comment on the evaluation of other proponents. (KB)</p>	<p>Some history of the PTS subcontracted manufacturer (GWM) was mentioned. Current GWM contracts are for truck components (Mack &amp; Volvo) and for Franna cranes (bodies, cabs, booms). GWM performs the majority of work on its own products such as transport equipment and agricultural machinery which it designs, manufactures, assembles, and markets in its own right.</p>

	Yes (KB)	
<p>5. Were the stated deficiencies all of the deficiencies found?</p>	<p>DMO will not comment on the evaluation of other proponents. (KB)</p>	<p>Any additional information provided may be a breach of probity.</p>
<p>6. A statement on the Force Protection (FPI) website said they provided extra information on 27th May 2010 (after the decision was made). What additional information did FPI provide to DMO / ADF?</p>	<p>The evaluation rated all proposals that achieved the minimum requirement equally. Extra protection did not add to the assessed benefit. (PTS responded that while this way of assessing the benefits might be useful to buyers of the vehicles, the vehicle's drivers might not agree.</p>	<p>A valid outcome of the DMO would be to provide the ADF (its customer) with whole-of-life value for money in a highly capable, best protected off-road vehicle. Improved protection should be considered as providing a greater benefit. Not to consider the potential for improved protection may be a process deficiency.</p>
<p>7. In the cost benefit analysis was an additional level of blast / ballistic protection taken into account?</p>	<p>DMO will not comment on the evaluation of other proponents. (KB)</p>	<p>PTS does not understand how all other proponents could have provided reasonable certainty of blast and ballistic protection levels at the time of submitting the response to the RFP. Was additional information sought from other proponents during the assessment process?</p>
<p>8. How is ballistic capability determined when all you have (at the time of receiving proposals) is a balsa &amp; plastic model?</p>	<p>DMO did not call proponents regarding</p>	<p></p>
<p>9. DMO made the statement that they had made numerous calls to proponents to clarify information contained within the RFP Responses. PTS stated that they had not received</p>	<p></p>	<p></p>

<p>one call from DMO. Did this mean that there was no ambiguity or uncertainty in PTS's response to the RFP?</p> <p>Did that mean that the DMO found nothing in PTS's response that was unclear or that DMO was uncertain about?</p>	<p>information deficiencies, only to clarify DMO's understanding of information provided.</p> <p>That is correct. (KB)</p>	
<p>10. How does PTS appeal this decision?</p> <p>PTS is not bound by the DMO's complaints procedure. How does PTS appeal this decision?</p> <p>Could PTS appeal to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal? (DA)</p>	<p>DMO provided PTS with its complaints procedure. (KB)</p> <p>PTS would need to seek its own legal advice on that (EW)</p>	<p>PTS reserves its position.</p>